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PAKISTAN: TUSSLE WITHIN
The Tajik Factor
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Musharraf has been able
to contain the opposition at home till now. But as bodies of more
jehadis arrive, he may face a violent backlash.
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Dostum's stronger Tajik rivals within the Northern
Alliance are more sceptical of the US. This faction, which gets military
supplies from Russia and Tajikistan across the Amu Darya, is wary of joint
operations, given the anti-US sentiment in Afghanistan. It wants to take
Kabul with minimum US support.
This is where Pakistan, yet again, becomes the
albatross around President George Bush's neck. While Washington would
be completely happy if a Tajik army swept the Taliban out of Kabul, Pakistan
would be positively worried. The Tajiks are no friends of the Pakistani
establishment and, to that extent, a Kabul in their control would be hostile
to Islamabad. The defence of Kabul is, therefore, a bit of an undeclared
Pakistani cause. Already a sizeable number of Arab and Pakistani mercenaries
have moved to Kabul to bolster Taliban positions.
As is evident, the US relationship with Pakistan
is a complex one. On the day the first bombs hit Afghanistan, Sandy Berger,
national security adviser to president Bill Clinton, warned, "Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan could be bin Laden's next twin towers"-the likely
targets of the world's most dangerous man.
The implication was clear: if Islamic zealots
overthrew pro-American rulers in these countries in a jehadi fulfilment
of the Domino Theory, the US would be landed with a world war. This is
the last thing Bush would want. Hence the effort to keep Musharraf afloat
and sometimes treat him with kid gloves.
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| INNOCENT VICTIMS: Coffins of the 16 Christians
massacred by unidentified gunmen in Bahawalpur on October 28 |
So far the Pakistani dictator has been nimble
enough to contain domestic opposition. An anti-war rally in Karachi in
the final week of October may have been attended by 50,000 people but
most other protests have been limited to a few thousand odd. Certainly,
for a country of 140 million those are not overwhelming figures.
Yet the size of the Karachi rally may indicate
that a certain threshold has been crossed. As the war lengthens, bodies
of Pakistanis killed in Afghanistan keep coming home, raising passions.
The case of the 35 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen members is, of course, well known.
The economic consequences of the conflict are already being felt. Industry
sources in the US speak of orders for Pakistan's garment industry going
down by 40 per cent since September 11.
Confident that conditions are finally suitable,
the Afghan Defence Council (ADC), a Pakistani religio-political organisation,
has asked thousands of followers to reach Islamabad on November 7 and
force the Musharraf Government to change its Afghan policy. "If it
fails to do so," a council statement read, "we will stay as
long as it takes to change the government."
General Musharraf and his American friends are
obviously gambling that the ADC and its cohorts will simply not be able
to mobilise enough people. The general is playing the ultimate double
game. He's asking the US to accept "moderate Taliban" elements
in a future Afghan government. He's also preparing for any eventuality
by telling his people that the doctrine of "strategic depth"-in
effect, making Afghanistan a Pakistani backyard to counter India-is "outdated"
since the country now has nuclear weapons.
In an atmosphere of such ambiguity, the US-Pakistan
bond is riddled with question marks. The confusion is summed up by Deepa
Ollapally, South Asia regional security specialist at the Washington-based
United States Institute of Peace, "The US is understanding of Pakistani
sensitivities. But the US-Pakistan relationship is unstable and one can't
say anything about the long run." It's the sort of analysis that
leaves nobody wiser.
The key to America's stake in Pakistan-and to
Musharraf's survival-is not so much street power as the role of the army.
There are indications of strains appearing in the Punjab province, which
forms the core of the Pakistan Army's officer cadre.
The US realises that its withdrawal from the
Asian region through the 1990s has deprived it of familiarity with the
younger generation of Pakistani army officers. Products of General Zia-ul-Haq's
"Islamisation drive" of the 1980s, these officers have never
seen the US as an active ally, at least not till September 2001.
Musharraf has to convince this section of his
officers that US assurances of economic aid and military supplies will
be honoured. It was not without reason that he invited the entire military
brass to meet General Franks. First, he was seeking a consensus on the
new American demands. Second, he was acquainting corps commanders hitherto
opposed to the air strikes with America, Pakistan's new old friend.
For every domestic Musharraf action, there is
an equal foreign reaction. So the General has to do some persuading of
the Americans as well. He has to convince them that their security interests
will be served best by putting in place a US-backed Afghan regime. Musharraf
will hope the Bush Administration's Cold War veterans will be tantalised
by the idea of a bridgehead into Central Asia, part of the Russian and
Chinese strategic domain.
In essence, Musharraf wants the US to ensure
that post-war Afghanistan is pro-Pakistan without Pakistan being fully
committed to winning the war in the first place. In this context the US
decision in the past week to bomb Taliban positions close to Northern
Alliance territory and aid the Alliance is fraught with meaning. US Defence
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's visits to Central Asia, Russia and India-on
November 5 he meets Defence Minister George Fernandes-suggests the US
may be moving some of its eggs out of the Pakistan basket. Is Washington
in a rethink mode? The answer could define the war's course-and Musharraf's
fateline. The question itself would be made redundant by Fahim Khan's
march to Kabul.
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