The fall of Kabul to the Northern Alliance was the Pakistani military strategists' worst nightmare come true. The Alliance is openly hostile to Pakistan, accusing it of nurturing the Taliban regime. For its part, the Pakistani establishment views the rag-tag Alliance as a bunch of opportunistic warlords who have strong links with competing regional powers such as Russia, Iran and India.

OH, TO BE A MARTYR: Armed Pakistani men cross the border to join the "holy war" against the US in Afghanistan

The sudden turn of events in Afghanistan has also left Pakistan's president, General Pervez Musharraf, with a humiliating metaphorical bloody nose. Since the start of the military campaign in Afghanistan, he was conveying to western leaders Pakistan's concerns about the Northern Alliance getting the upper hand.

Pakistan's reversal of its seven-year policy of support for the Taliban was, at least tacitly, predicated on the understanding that no government hostile to Pakistan would be installed in Kabul. On November 11-during Musharraf's first trip to western capitals since assuming power two years ago-Musharraf and US President George W. Bush had sounded a note of warning to the Alliance at a joint press conference, stressing that the anti-Taliban forces should stop short of the Afghan capital and not attempt to overrun it.

With the Alliance consolidating its hold on Kabul, Musharraf is in the unenviable position of having to explain his inability to address Pakistan's concerns. There are already murmurs that Musharraf let the US take him for a ride and that America will now find Pakistan dispensable.

Washington insists military realities on the ground outpaced the political process. But senior officials in Pakistan privately scoff at the idea that the Northern Alliance could have gone into Kabul without receiving at least a tacit go-ahead from the West. They point out that American and British special forces were directing the advance of the anti-Taliban forces from the ground.

HEAR HEAR! Bush watches as Musharraf holds forth at a press conference in New York

Meanwhile, the Pakistan Foreign Office is scrambling to explain what has been termed "a strategic debacle" in at least one Pakistani newspaper. In a statement on November 13-a few hours after Alliance Forces moved into Kabul-Foreign Office spokesperson Aziz Khan reiterated that "Pakistan continues to hold the view that the Northern Alliance must not occupy Kabul ... No single group or faction can bring peace to that country."

Khan was more blunt 24 hours later. "If the current situation is allowed to persist for long," he warned, "it could lead to civil war as in the past." His ominous tone echoed Pakistani concerns about the lack of representation of the majority Pashtoon community within the Northern Alliance.

Whatever strain the Northern Alliance takeover of Kabul may put on Pakistan-US ties, it has certainly put Musharraf under immense pressure. Opposition politicians such as those of the rightist Jamaat-e-Islami are already criticising the General's alleged gullibility in putting his faith on the US. "General Musharraf will now be subject to severe criticism both within and outside the military," points out liberal political commentator Ghazi Salahuddin. "The crux of this criticism will be that the General's decision to support the US in its war against Afghanistan has not resulted in any strategic gains for Pakistan." Earlier, Musharraf had justified Pakistan's reversal of Afghan policy on the grounds that it was necessary to safeguard Pakistan's "national interests". He is now in the unenviable position of having to explain how they have been safeguarded in Afghanistan.

Even more worrying for Pakistan, some intelligence reports indicate that hardline Taliban and Al Qaida fighters are moving into Pakistan's tribal border territories over which the federal government has limited control. Apparently they have orders from Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar to withdraw from the cities and prepare for a prolonged guerrilla battle from these areas. "This is the real danger for Pakistan," says Salahuddin. "If there is a force in Kabul that is perceived as anti-Pakistan, religious militancy and hawkishness will increase in Pakistan, particularly in the tribal areas where the Pashtoon factor will also add to the fire." The divide between state policies that support religious extremism, such as that of the Taliban, and Musharraf's vision of Pakistan as a moderate, liberal society will certainly deepen. This will have an impact on Pakistan's Kashmir policy.

For the time being, Pakistan is hoping that international pressure to implement the United Nations plan for a broad-based two-year interim coalition in Kabul is brought to bear on the Northern Alliance. Privately some officials may also hope that rifts will appear among the Alliance's component parties in the bid for political power.

Pakistan has stepped up efforts for evolving a consensus within the disparate Pashtoon factions as a step towards their participation in a broad-based government. A meeting on November 13 in Islamabad called by former Pakistan president Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari attempted to bring together Pashtoon leaders from south and east Afghanistan. Another had been convened in Peshawar a month ago under the aegis of moderate Pashtoon leader Pir Sayed Ahmed Gilani.

No major Taliban leaders have so far taken part in these consultations, but this need not damage the chances of an understanding, given the nature of changing loyalties in Afghanistan. This is especially possible if the Pashtoons come to see the Northern Alliance as marginalising their influence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's hopes, it seems, are pinned on the former king, Zahir Shah, a Durrani Pashtoon from Kandahar, whom it sees as leading a Loya Jirga (Grand Council). Musharraf stated in a recent interview that there appeared no alternative to Shah "at the moment". It is a measure of Pakistan's desperation to find an alternative to the Northern Alliance that it is embracing a man it has often dismissed as irrelevant.

Zahir Shah is respected by most Afghans, who remember his pre-1973 tenure as peaceful and progressive, but it is unclear if the Northern Alliance will now agree on a role for him. Shah's representatives in Rome were critical of the Alliance for reneging on its promises to the former king to not enter Kabul. And the Northern Alliance's president, Burhanuddin Rabbani, has stated recently that the former king may return "only as a private person".

On the positive side, the Pakistan and the Northern Alliance may be trying to build bridges. It is being claimed that Musharraf received reconciliatory feelers in his meetings with Iranian and Turkish leaders who have influence in the Northern Alliance. This would be of mutual benefit. One criticism of Pakistani policy has been that ideologically motivated intelligence operatives had made Pakistan put all its eggs in the Taliban basket.

All these political manoeuvrings are, however, based on the belief that the fall of Kabul and other major cities spells the end of the Taliban. Given the fluidity of the situation and Mullah Omar's calls for a guerrilla war, such a presumption may be too early. In which case, renewed conflict in Afghanistan would certainly spill across the Durand Line.