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 What
the Northern Alliance had been unable to accomplish in over four years,
it did so in a span of less than four days in a military blitzkrieg, capturing
almost half of Afghanistan from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kabul. This exposed
the myth of the Taliban as a determined foe and fighter, as it beat a
hasty retreat from the Afghan capital to the Pashtoon-dominated southwestern
parts of Afghanistan.
There were five reasons for the stunning success of the alliance.
# The sustained US air campaign made it difficult for the Taliban to
hold on to its defences around major cities.
# American pressure on Pakistan prevented Islamabad from providing military
backing to the Taliban-both with equipment and manpower-which had given
the Taliban all its earlier military gains. After all, until recently
it was Pakistani soldiers that had done most of the fighting for the Taliban.
# Large scale defections from the Taliban ranks left gaps in the defences.
# Once Mazar-e-Sharif fell, the Taliban decided to tactically withdraw
from other cities to prevent unnecessary casualties.
# The Taliban's decision to scatter itself in the Pashtoon areas of
south-eastern Afghanistan and wait for developments to unfold.
The week-long battle for Mazar-e-Sharif witnessed some vintage warfare.Backed
by intensive American bombing, the combined forces of Dostam and Atta
broke through two rings of Taliban defences to capture the city.
And hours later, they began chasing the retreating Taliban both towards
Kunduz and Taloqan, before linking up with Fahim Khan's forces on the
outskirts of Kabul. This cleared the way for the forces of Fahim Khan,
waiting at Bagram for weeks, to roll onto the streets of Kabul without
much opposition. Ghazni and Jalalabad followed suit.
Time to Go For The Kill
In all likelihood, the future course will be dominated by three issues.
One, the Taliban is now back on familiar grounds-in the Pashtoon-dominated
area-from where it began the takeover of Afghanistan; here it can easily
mix with the locals and make it difficult for any force to target them.
Two, the Taliban could use the age-old caves across the region to fight
a guerrilla war. And three, with winter setting in, it will be hard to
sustain a momentum in the operations of the land forces unless the US
and Britain are ready to commit a much larger number of special forces
to speed up the capture of Kandahar and other key areas. A large-scale
land operation would require more than two lakh US troops and many months
of fighting.
While the US bombings will continue, through the month of Ramzan, this
alone is unlikely to destroy the targets. The US has two options: either
to launch special forces or a full-fledged air-and-land campaign, like
the one witnessed a decade ago in the Gulf. For this, the US would require:
First, Islamabad's permission to establish a large enclave in Pakistan
that would allow the US to build up a full field army with shipments of
troops. Secondly, ability to launch a successful offensive in south Afghanistan
now that there is no surprise element in the direction of the attack.
And finally, a willingness to fight land battles, against a scattered
enemy in a land strewn with mines. This could lead to heavy casualties,
something the Americans prefer to avoid.
Therefore, the next phase of the battle could see a more extensive use
of special forces to seek and destroy Al Qaida supporters around Kandahar.
For this the more likely course would be the launch of operations against
Taliban hiding in irrigation tunnels, old mines and rock caves. The caves
will first have to be identified through spy satellites and local intelligence.
Then low-flying helicopters and thermal imaging devices can be used to
"sense" people hiding inside. And finally, the US troops will
have to use either explosives to blow up the caves or enter the caves
to fight within its unfamiliar and complex maze of tunnels. The last is
the most dangerous and would only be undertaken to eliminate high profile
targets like Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar.
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ISSUE NOV 26, 2001
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