The tragic events of September 11 have dramatically altered American foreign policy. The struggle against terrorism has become the principal lens through which Washington now views other countries. In South Asia, this has meant war in Afghanistan against the Taliban, hosts of Osama bin Laden, and an upswing in relations with Pakistan after President Pervez Musharraf joined the anti-terrorist coalition. Regarding India, the warm welcome that President George W. Bush accorded Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee recently in Washington reflected the US Administration's positive response to Delhi's cooperative stance.

The contrast with the events after the Russian army moved into Afghanistan in 1979 couldn't be more striking. In January 1980, Indira Gandhi's government whitewashed the Soviets in the UN special session on Afghanistan. In 2001, Vajpayee unequivocally supported the US campaign. Even though Pakistan's decision to join the coalition has diminished the importance of India's offering the use of its facilities, the gesture was much appreciated. In 1980, Washington largely wrote off Delhi. The Americans focused on enlisting Pakistan in opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan. In view of the Iranian hostage crisis, the US could do nothing about Afghanistan without Pakistan's help.

In September 2001-in contrast to presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan-Bush didn't bargain for Pakistan's help, but bluntly asked Islamabad to decide where it stood. The existence of the Northern Alliance and the fact that Afghanistan's other neighbours are opposed to the Taliban and bin Laden increased US leverage and reduced dependence on Pakistan. India's support for the US reflected Delhi's calculations about India's interests, but also showed the change in the Indo-US equation since the Cold War.

By September 2001, Bush had made clear his wish to continue the process of improving bilateral relations that President Bill Clinton had begun-a wish the Vajpayee Government shared. The sudden turnaround in US-Pakistan relations since Musharraf decided to drop the Taliban has not diminished the Bush Administration's desire for better relations with Delhi. The secretaries of state and defense emphasised this during their recent visits to India and the President underscored this hope when he hosted Vajpayee at the White House on November 9. Never before in the 54 years of India's independence had a prime minister been received officially in Washington two years in a row.

The Bush Administration would like to keep its dealings with India and Pakistan on separate tracks but is well aware that issues such as Kashmir and military aid to Pakistan will have a major impact on US-India relations. The Bush-Vajpayee communique bluntly stated, "Both countries are targets of terrorism as seen in the barbaric attacks on 11th September on the United States and on 1st October in Kashmir." On this issue, American officials feel they have met India's sensitivities. They also think that Delhi should realise that although Musharraf has been able to effect a 180-degree turn in Pakistan's Afghanistan policy-at considerable risk to his own future-he can't do the same publicly on Kashmir and survive. Washington believes Musharraf can rein in ISI support for jehadis and trusts he will do so. The last thing the Americans want, with US forces engaged in Afghanistan, is a flare up between India and Pakistan.

The second "hot button" issue concerns military assistance to Pakistan. So far, the US and Pakistan-until Musharraf raised the F-16 issue in his November 9 interview with The New York Times-have focused on debt relief and enhanced economic assistance in order to arrest the downward slide of the Pakistan economy. Quite apart from the negative impact on US-India relations, large-scale military help would be at cross-purposes with the effort to boost Pakistan's economy, seen as essential if Musharraf is to pull his country back from the precipice of national failure.

Looking ahead, this observer believes that the Vajpayee Government is keeping its eye on trying to maintain the forward movement bilaterally with Washington, and is not likely to allow the rapid turnaround in US-Pakistan relations to throw it off track. Similarly, the Bush Administration has maintained its goal of "transforming" the US-India relationship and seems unlikely to disregard India's concerns on terrorism in Kashmir or large-scale military aid to Pakistan. If both Washington and Delhi maintain these approaches, the outlook for expanded Indo-US cooperation is positive.

(The writer is a retired State Department South Asia specialist, author of the recently published United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies, and currently a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center)