September 11, or 9/11 in the way Americans juxtapose day and month, has been a defining moment for the US and indeed for the world at large.13/12 is a watershed for India. Anger and outrage at what happened at Parliament House is perfectly justifiable. However, it is equally important to keep a sense of balance, the sort that A.B. Vajpayee kept during Kargil and earned India international support. Whatever India's short-term response, military or otherwise, the events nevertheless underscore the urgent need for the US to have a long-term strategy in South Asia given its influence with both the nuclear adversaries. This may not be the best of times in this country to even think of a US role. But for the sake of peace and prosperity in this troubled region we must look beyond the immediate.

Between a policy of benign neglect that the US has followed in the past and a policy of active "intervention" sought by Pakistan along the lines of the American involvement in the Middle East and Northern Ireland peace process but unacceptable to India, there is a middle ground that the US can occupy to the advantage of India, Pakistan and itself. It is time for the US to formulate a minimalist agenda based on realistic milestones that are achievable. This would not be third-party intervention but certainly third-party cajoling, persuading, catalysing, nudging and all other such verbs that convey a more friendly image than pressurising and intervening. The sad reality is that without such US prodding, India and Pakistan just will not engage each other meaningfully.

First, the US must take an active interest in pushing India and Pakistan to enter into a confidence-building agreement on nuclear and missile matters. In February 1999 the two nuclear adversaries had signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to enhance peace and security between themselves but unfortunately the Kargil conflict intervened and it was forgotten. It is this MoU that needs to be converted into an enforceable, monitorable and verifiable nuclear and missile management treaty.

Second, the US must get India and Pakistan to enhance economic ties between themselves. It was largely with American and World Bank support that India and Pakistan signed the landmark Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 after eight years of negotiations. An Iran-Pakistan-India or a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline could have great political symbolism apart from its economic benefits. On trade, the US must prevail upon Pakistan to give up its resistance to extending MFN (most favoured nation) status to India which is India's legitimate due under international trade agreements. This means duties imposed by Pakistan on Indian imports will be no different from those imposed on imports from other countries and India will not be discriminated against. As for India, it already grants MFN status to Pakistan.

Third, the US must ensure that Pakistan and its proxies do not vitiate the atmosphere in the run-up to the elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly that are due before October 2002. It must also gently tell India to enhance the credibility of the electoral process in Jammu and Kashmir. One way to do so would be for India to invite an international group of observers comprising people like Nelson Mandela and Bill Clinton. India will also have to think seriously about broad-basing the political process in Jammu and Kashmir. The US could also get India and Pakistan to appoint high-level political envoys to start talking about longer-term options in Jammu and Kashmir.

Fourth, the US must move India and Pakistan to start serious talks to resolve non-Kashmir-related disputes. Twice, in 1989 and 1992, a deal on the Siachen glacier had almost been clinched at the official level but was killed by political pusillanimity on both sides. Similarly, the elements of how to solve the land and maritime boundary problems in the Sir Creek area in the Rann of Kutch had been agreed to by both sides over eight years ago but no agreement has materialised.

Fifth, given the influential role played by the sub-continental diaspora, American think tanks must take the lead in starting what could be a Track-III in addition to the official Track-I and non-official Track-II, both of which, sadly, are themselves stalled presently. Recently, two American foundations supported a study that resulted in a remarkable book India and Pakistan: The Costs of Conflict, the Benefits of Peace by a distinguished Pakistani militaryman Major-General Mahmud Ali Durrani. Indian and Pakistani scientists working in the US, like M.V. Ramana and Zia Mian, have co-authored blueprints for nuclear peace.

Patience and low-profile are words not normally associated with American diplomacy. But that is exactly what is needed in our region where a historic opportunity has opened up. It is up to the Americans to grasp it.

(The author is with the Congress party. These are his personal views)