Sep 21, 1998
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BOOK EXTRACT: ACROSS
BORDERS Passing the Test
In the following edited extracts, Dixit looks at foreign policy post-Pokhran.
A number of questions have been raised about the Government
of India's decision to go nuclear in terms of its defence capacities. They need answers.
The first question asked was: Why did India end its ambiguity and carry out the tests? The
answer simply lies with reference to the security environment around India, stretching
from Diego Garcia in the west in an encircling arc right up to Pakistan, the Gulf and the
Straits of Hormuz. There are a number of countries with a nuclear weapon presence in this
entire region, one of which, Pakistan, has threatened the use of its nuclear and missile
capacities against India more than once. Pakistan's relations with other nuclear weapon
powers such as China and the US are a factor which cannot be ignored by India. Secondly,
the conducting of tests was necessary for India to ascertain for itself what its
capacities were and to make the Indian public generally aware of these capacities and to
impart to them a sense of confidence. The second question asked is about the timing of
these tests. Why did India go in for these tests at this point of time in 1998? The
reasons were twofold. First, the conducting of these tests was necessary for technological
and operational reasons, the objective being to lay the foundations for India to develop a
deployable deterrent capacity against potential threats. India had already delayed this
process; a delay which had affected its security. Secondly, apart from having to break out
of the straitjacket of punitive and discriminatory stipulations which would have become
operational under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the end of 1999, these stipulations
would have been further compounded by the fissile material cut-off treaty, coming up for
discussion in the Conference on Disarmament. The third question asked is about the
legitimacy of a minority and coalition government taking such a vital decision. In terms
of seats in Parliament and related statistics, the Vajpayee Government might be a minority
government, but in terms of voting patterns in the 1996 and 1998 elections there can be
little doubt that the BJP's foreign policy and security policy orientations have the
general support of the Indian public, and unlike the preceding Deve Gowda and Gujral
governments, the Vajpayee Government is led by the largest single party in the Lower House
(Lok Sabha) of the Indian Parliament. In terms of public opinion, conducting of the tests
seems to have the general endorsement of the people of India. The fourth criticism
levelled is that the Government did not consult various parties before taking the
decision. Such sensitive decisions are not preceded by public debate and political
consultations. Mrs Indira Gandhi did not consult various political parties before the 1974
nuclear test. The requirements of political secrecy and technological confidentiality
precluded such consultations. On the whole, India's acquiring the nuclear bomb is justified: first, on the ground of its national security requirements in the present regional context. Second, as a continuing basis for technological self-reliance for defence purposes. Third, to structure a strategic balance in its neighbourhood, given the weapons capacities and deployments of superpowers in the region. Fourth, to avoid being subjected to restrictive and punitive international regimes, by being categorised as a non-nuclear weapons state. (Whatever the legal squabbles, de facto, India's nuclear weapons status cannot be questioned). Fifth, the Indian objective is to change the discriminatory terms of reference governing negotiations on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, which are sought to be perpetrated by the existing nuclear weapons states. This is precisely why India may not be inclined to sign the CTBT in its present form, much less the NPT. Sixth, and the most important of all, India's nuclear weaponisation is motivated more by political and strategic purposes than operational military intentions. India will only opt for the latter under compelling and unavoidable circumstances. Taking note of the fact that India's self-restraint did not evoke a rational response from the international community, particularly the superpowers, India perforce has had to accept the wisdom of the dictum given by George Herbert in his book Jacula Prudentum way back in 1651 that: "Having one sword keeps the swords of others in their sheaths." An initial explanatory damage control exercise has been underway since early June. What is needed is a multidimensional effort to deal with the pressures mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. India need not be in a hurry to sign the CTBT. India should further immediately offer to enter into technical discussions with all the nuclear weapons states with the objective of assuring them that it shall abide by discipline and be restrained as far as India's genuine concerns and declared strategic status are recognised. We can also consider taking the position that we shall abide by the stipulations of the CTBT to the maximum extent possible, without being a party to it (as far as it remains a discriminatory agreement), exactly as the Chinese have declared that though not being a signatory to the missile technology control regime, they adhere to its provisions. He should give a unilateral commitment of "no first use" of our nuclear weapons capacities to the international community and to our neighbours, particularly to Pakistan. We should indicate our willingness to participate in the negotiations for the FMCT. These are the issues which can form the subjects of technical negotiations. We must assure the United States, Pakistan, Russia, China, the UK and France that our nuclear weapon status will not pose an aggressive strategic threat to any country. This should be done at the highest political level. Initial indications are that the world at large is not likely to declare an economic and technological war on India collectively. There would be selective imposition of sanctions, the magnitude of which would be determined by individual countries. Our response should not be confrontationist. It should be patient, sober and rational. There should be no element of jingoism in our political and diplomatic postures. We will have to undertake a concerted and stable campaign aimed at the multilateral financial institutions to head off any excessively negative decisions being taken by them against India. Initial assessments are that we can survive the sanctions if there is political unity and stability and if we carry on with our economic restructuring and reforms in a purposeful and dynamic manner, not allowing partisan politics to affect the process. Our own technological and infrastructural capacities and trained manpower resources should enable us to survive this particular pressure to some extent. If over a period of the coming year or two, the world gets convinced about our rationale and responsible behaviour, sanctions may diminish. We must utilise the influential non-resident Indian communities in advanced industrial countries to remove suspicions and doubts about us and to generate positive points of view in the establishments of these countries regarding India. |
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With the intention of providing a
different perspective on India's foreign policy, J.N. Dixit, former foreign secretary and
prolific policy analyst, has now come out with a book that has a majestic sweep:
undercurrents of India's foreign policy during the past 50 years. He comes to the
conclusion that "we have managed our foreign relations with practicality and good
sense in the process of meeting our fundamental national interests". Coming from an
initiator of many subtle policy shifts, this is not quite an unexpected remark. Dixit has,
in one way or the other, been a part of the foreign policy establishment in the country
for 36 of the 50 years that he is analysing in this book. But in taking on a task which
few international experts would have dared, Dixit has tried to give some clarity and sense
to policy initiatives which are at the best of times buried in diffused dialectics. Across
Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy (Picus Books, Rs 450) starts off from the
philosophical origins, courses through what he calls the Indo-centric phase, and ends with
an assessment of India as a nuclear weapons power. The first eight chapters are about the
evolution of Indian foreign policy, the second section looks at specific issues like
Kashmir and the third section consists of a critical evaluation of policy characteristics
during the past 50 years and the challenges that Indian diplomacy may face in the future. 
The complete manuscript of this book (or so I thought) had gone to the
publishers late in March 1998. I had a general sense of satisfaction that I had covered
all major developments in India's foreign policy over the last 50 years. But then as the
Greek philosopher Thracymacus observed sagaciously nearly a millennium ago:
"Presuming certainties in political processes is the profoundest mistake in human
affairs." As if to prove Thracymacus right, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
announced on the afternoon of May 11, 1998 that India had conducted three nuclear tests,
including a thermonuclear test a little after 3 p.m. on that date. India conducted two
more subkiloton nuclear device tests on May 13. India had crossed the nuclear Rubicon, the
Lakshman Rekha, so to say, of reticences regarding nuclear weaponisation to assert and
affirm its position as a nuclear weapons power. 
