February 23, 1998

If a coalition is inevitable at least let it be free of insidious outside support.

Even in a polity riddled with contradictions, this is an irony that stands out. In the 1998 election campaign, the outgoing United Front (UF) regime has been disparaged as a khichdi of 14 parties. Yet, opinion polls and emergent trends would suggest that its successor will be a coalition equally disparate and perhaps even larger. Barring last-minute swings, a hung Lok Sabha is imminent. It will be rationalised in terms of a process of social churning. It will be explained in terms of a fractured mandate. It will be blamed on parochial, short-sighted politicians who offer their voters limited choices and evoke primordial passions. It will be welcomed as a reflection of the composite nature of Indian nationhood. The upshot, however, will be the installation of another motley crew in the Union Cabinet. UF and Congress or BJP and allies: the fabric can be stitched differently. Nevertheless, the texture will be the same: uneven.

It is easy to be cynical in these times, to conclude that India post-election '98 will be positioned precisely where it was in the aftermath of the polls of 1996. This need not be the case. The roughly two-year interlude between the 11th and 12th general elections holds many lessons for India, its voters and its political parties. Voters have to realise that stable, coherent and authoritative governance cannot flow from a confused popular verdict. A national election has to be tackled in terms of larger issues -- not influenced by sectarian compulsions or inherited biases. Profound as such homilies may seem, they are meaningless after the electorate has made up its mind and after the last ballot has been cast. It is then that the political parties must display some measure of maturity. This is just what was missing from the UF-Congress intercourse in the past year.

An unwillingness to compromise, to accept the exigencies of sharing power have been the bane of Central coalitions in this country. In October 1946, the Muslim League joined the Congress in the "interim government" of undivided India. Liaqat Ali Khan was appointed finance minister and busied himself thwarting the proposals of his Congress colleagues. The interim government, to quote Jawaharlal Nehru, reached a "standstill" -- and collapsed. It is amazing that the very sequence could be used to describe the UF Government's travails during Congress President Sitaram Kesri's prolonged and repeated bouts of blackmail. India's political institutions have insisted on learning nothing from their past. Unfortunately, as coalitions become the norm, such intransigence is going to be difficult for the nation to afford.

It is imperative in these circumstances for a certain dispassionate collective cogitation and the preparation of a blueprint for coalitions. This has to be done before the next prime minister is sworn in. If perennially quarrelsome parties are incapable of taking any such initiative, perhaps it must come from Rashtrapati Bhavan. The President should not even consider the option of a non-participatory coalition. As H.D. Deve Gowda and I.K. Gujral muddled along in office, the Congress and the CPI(M) enjoyed power without responsibility, famously described by a British statesman as "the harlot's privilege". The recurrence of this tragic farce would be untenable. Every party backing a ruling coalition must have a stake in governance. The burden of administration will, hopefully, be a moderating influence on the dissolute ecstasy of rhetoric.

Further, the parties entering into a coalition must evolve a mechanism to iron out possible inconsistencies in policies and ideation. A steering committee akin to the ones which have presided over the UF and bound together the Left Front in West Bengal may be the answer. When Gujral became prime minister in April 1997, the UF and the Congress promised the President that a coordination committee would be formed on these lines. It was a promise that was never kept; and with calamitous consequences. Such an institutionalised interface must be a pre-requisite to any future coalition. It is necessary as a sort of arbiter in a coalition many of whose members are numerically matched. It is even more necessary in a coalition where one party -- say, the BJP -- commands a disproportionate share of the legislative strength. In the second paradigm the insecurities of the smaller partners, their fear of being overwhelmed, plain bullied or even split by the big brother have to be addressed -- and will need to be addressed constantly through the term of the coalition.

It is facile to say that Indian politicians are not temperamentally suited to coalitions, that they still nurture hopes of single-party rule. Such vacuous sophistry does not take away from the basic point: it is no longer relevant to ask why a coalition exists in India -- it is pertinent to ask how India can exist with coalitions. Anything else would be an invitation to another mid-term election.

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