The LCA too has run into some serious problems. Since the fly-by-wire aircraft is inherently unstable and is critically dependent on computers and software to fly, no test pilot, or for that matter designer, would want to risk a flight without thoroughly validating the system. Aeronautical Development Agency officials in charge of the design say that clearance has been given for a ground-run of the engine in the first prototype. Other systems, especially the electronics are being tested in the 'Iron Bird' test-bed have since June.

The DRDO is itself to blame for much of its woes. Under its former chief V.S. Arunachalam's tutelage, it developed and perfected a technique of hard-sell that combined a publicity blitz with political pressure. Thus, in 1988, even as the missile programme was in its infancy, the government had pressured the Army to commit Rs 580 crore from their planned expenditure to purchase Prithvi and Trishul.

In a bid to boost their budget and bureaucratic empires, the DRDO volunteered to make virtually everything for the forces. By 1989, they had accumulated some 989 projects, many of which they simply did not have the ability to handle. The Arjun MBT is an example. A parliamentary committee sarcastically remarked in 1995 that the process of learning how to make tanks was taken up by the DRDO after the "project was taken in hand".

With Arunachalam calling it quits to seek greener pastures in the United States, Kalam took over as head of the DRDO. Soon it became clear that though he lacked Arunachalam's bureaucratic skills, he was as savvy a marketing man. Shy and retiring, Kalam has out-shone Arunachalam in his ability to handle both the services and the bureaucratic system in Delhi. Kalam's forte is a combination of his prestige, hard-sell and selective publicity which has helped him cross many an obstacle. This style was evident this September when the DRDO held its directors' conference. The centre-piece of the function, complete with a parade and bands, was the presentation of a newly-instituted award to the retiring army chief Shankar Roy Chowdhury for "promotion of self-reliance". DRDO officials insist, however, that the award was a gesture of appreciation for the general for having overridden his general staff teams' objections to Arjun by conducting the last set of trials himself. On May 31, the last day of the summer trials, Roy Chowdhury had 16 derelict tanks scattered randomly at the test range. Then, choosing two of the four Arjun tanks, he called out the target number at random and ordered them to fire. The result: 15 out of 16 hits.

But the DRDO has clearly failed to win over the crucial middle and upper rung of the armed forces. The blame rests on both sides. "Using Kalam's prestige to steam-roll opposition is not the best way to promote user-designer synergy," says one army officer. Mouthing the politically correct mantra of indigenisation is fine, but of little comfort to soldiers who would, understandably, like to be equipped with the best weapon available when they go to battle.

Arunachalam and Kalam have been the protagonists of a national article of faith that seeks self-reliance in almost all fields, especially defence. The reality is somewhat different. More than one-third of the budget for the missile programme, the Arjun MBT and the LCA has gone into imports. And there will be more imports since the LCA and MBT will use foreign engines because indigenous engine programmes are faltering. Indigenisation is what the DRDO was to have been all about since its creation in 1948. But last year, the Government admitted that only 30 per cent of Indian weapons were of domestic origin and promptly created a "Self Reliance Implementation Council", chaired by Kalam. The council would take the level of indigenisation to 70 per cent by 2005. This target, too, could slip, especially since massive purchases of Russian equipment have already begun. Kalam's aides are right when they say that if the DRDO had not used the tactics it has to sell its products, India would have been worse off. The DRDO's grouse is that imported equipment sails through without trials, while their products have to pass through stringent tests and bureaucratic hurdles. "The existing general staff of the Army just does not have the experience to induct an indigenous weapons system," says one disgruntled army officer seconded to the DRDO.

Designing and developing weapons is not an easy task. The DRDO suffers from the poor r&d culture in India. DRDO scientists and engineers, who are rarely from iits, have done a remarkable job, but they have not been helped by the structural environment in which this effort is taking place. Also, being a government department, promotions are slow and bureaucratised. Of great concern is the continuing exodus to the new information technology firms springing up around Bangalore, Pune and Hyderabad.

Another problem is the rocky relationship with the armed forces, but this is inevitable in a situation where one is the "seller" and the other, the monopoly "buyer". The DRDO rightly argues that the armed forces do not understand the design and development process. Barring the Navy, none of the three services has an in-house team of specialists which can assess DRDO work and effectively critique it as it goes along. To cap it all, the Army and Air Force chiefs have whimsically interfered with qualitative requirements mid-way through projects.

The separation of the Defence Research Department from that of defence production and acquisition is another major problem. "Most producers of equipment, be it McDonnell Douglass or Teledyne have their research and production under the same boss," argues an analyst. The result is that in the past, DRDO-designed products such as the 105-mm field gun and the Indra low-level radar ran into problems once their manufacture was handed over to a public sector unit or ordnance factory. In turn, the production units charge that DRDO designs do not have quality-control built into them. All this does not augur well for a country which is now set to commit tens of thousands of crores of rupees to serially manufacture the MBT, sams and the LCA and equip the armed forces with them.

The country deserves the best bang for the buck, and to ensure that the fruits of research become usable products, the Government needs to merge the defence research and production departments, prod the armed forces to develop an r&d culture. The DRDO and Kalam too need to develop an r&d culture that relies less on public relations and more on achieving realistic time frames and performance parameters, and an open style that acknowledges problems as and when they face them. As of now it appears that all the problems of the Arjun, Trishul and Akash and the LCA can be resolved with a bit of technological and managerial quick-fix. But those who expect these to be "world class" systems need to be reminded that a poor and backward country cannot create such weapons overnight. However, if it puts lots of heads together and has the right attitude, it could come close.

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