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When Indira Gandhi became prime minister of India in early
1966 she had nowhere to go but up. Her first spell in
power was unremarkable; but she was protected by the theory
of low expectations.
The
Congress, as an institution, which it still was, also
cushioned the inexperience of the prime minister, surrounding
her with a heavyweight cabinet in which she was less than
an equal and even heavier weight chief ministers and regional
satraps who commanded Delhi to listen to them rather than
the other way around. They all made a fatal mistake, symbolised
by the contemptuous phrase used by the acerbic socialist
leader Ram Manohar Lohia, when they dismissed her as a
"gungee guriya" -- literally, a dumb doll.
Her
first general election was a disaster. The Congress managed
a weak majority in the Lok Sabha and was defeated in every
state between Punjab and Bengal. Defeat, characteristically,
brought out the best in her. She understood quickly that
the voter had tired of the Congress promise because the
party had not delivered on either poverty or peace. The
mid-'60s were characterised by a famine of pre-1947 proportions;
communal riots had lit up the sky in city after northern
city; naxalites had launched their prairie fire across
the nation; and north and south had clashed in a bitter
language war. Every doomsayer's book was being reprinted.
Mrs
Gandhi belonged to what might be called the second generation
of those who had fought for freedom: the children of men
and women who had challenged the British over salt and
demanded that the foreigner quit India. She knew that
the Congress had already lost her own generation; and
the only way forward was to resurrect the hope that had
died. This was the easy part.
Her
genius lay not in diagnosis but in the prescription. She
knew that the Congress had to be reinvented if it were
to survive. The story of that reinvention has been told
too often to bear repetition; suffice it to say that warriors
of the ilk of Kamaraj, S.K. Patil, Atulya Ghosh et al,
would not have been demolished if they had not underestimated
her. In the end she proved to be clever, and they too
clever by half. The establishment she had defeated --
a sort of India's Delhi beltway -- simply could not believe
that the Young Turks she had energised would demolish
the Pashas running the empire.
The
venerable Frank Moraes, covering the 1971 elections, prophesied
her political end in a series of articles titled Myth
and Reality. Like so many others, he confused the two.
Perhaps, after 1971, she had nowhere to go but down.
1971
was her finest hour: triumph in a general election and
an astounding feat of diplomatic-military skill by which
Bangladesh became liberated. Atal Bihari Vajpayee described
her as Durga, yet another instance in his career when
he said the right thing at the right time.
The
extraordinary thing is how quickly it all began to go
wrong. The oldest adage in the business was proven right:
power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
As long as she was in the dispensable mould, she was superb;
the moment she became indispensable in her own eyes, mistakes
tumbled over one another until they forced an unprecedented
and unbelievable Emergency upon the nation.
There
were traces of paranoia in the economic management of
the country, as for instance when D.P. Dhar proposed a
takeover of the wheat trade. Taxes on a class that could
have become the creative dynamo of the economy, the professionals,
became punitive while political corruption escalated and
the non-productive sectors were fattened in the name of
socialism. Propaganda became more important than reality,
and Mrs Gandhi finally became a victim to her own propaganda.
It was sinister political ailment, not least because the
1971 class of lean and hungry advisers gave way to men
who were fat with self-importance and fed her every lie,
rumour and mirage in the name of loyalty. In 1977 the
people brought the Empress back to street level.
Mrs
Gandhi's greatest benefactors were her opponents. Her
opponents in Congress wore blinkers made of the cotton
pillows on which they sat during party meetings.
Her
enemies outside were even worse. They were so corrupt
and stupid during their first opportunity in power, in
the state governments of the north from Punjab to Bengal
that they scarred our language permanently with terms
like Aya Ram and Gaya Ram.
They
repeated the exercise, in silliness if not always in corruption,
when the Janata Party formed the government in Delhi in
1977. It is a government remembered today by Morarji Desai's
urine. Little wonder that the voter literally begged Mrs
Gandhi to return in the winter of 1980-81.
This
time, she had nowhere to go but to her family. Sanjay
Gandhi marked the arrival of inexperience into the highest
levels of decision-making. That was the real tragedy.
His youth could have proved useful for both Mrs Gandhi
and her party if it had been directed purely into an appropriate
level; but Sanjay was making, and soon unmaking, chief
ministers. His death seemed to still her. Her only real
answer was personal. She persuaded her older son Rajiv
to become her successor. Party democracy as a concept
was over.
Mrs
Gandhi had in 1971 cloaked the fragility of the Congress;
10 years later, not only had the party's institutions
withered but the systems of decision-making, which had
controlled the sensitive balance of our nation, had started
getting dismantled. The imperial prime ministership, formally
launched in 1975, continued, albeit without censorship
or arrests. The fields of Punjab turned red with blood;
the skies went up in flames. A hope that had arisen in
India beside a red rose was, alas, brutally snuffed out
by its own guardians.
If
Mrs Gandhi had been less than the genius she was, she
would also have been mourned less. History tends to have
little time for death. But generations have a lot of time
for regret. Those who lived through the era of Indira
Gandhi know what she achieved; they also know what she
might have achieved but for the flaw that makes heroes
into themes of tragic poetry.
Mrs
Gandhi started as Joan of Arc, and ended as King Lear.
But in those 18 years of politics and power she not only
changed India, she even changed Pakistan.
M.J.
Akbar is editor in chief, The Asian Age,
and author of four books, The Siege Within: Challenges
to a Nation's Unity; Nehru: The Making of India; Riot
After Riot and Kashmir: Behind the Vale.
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